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B's service for one year. B refuses to do the work. A can
get judgment for the value of the service 'promised less the
value of the land retained by him." In the present action,
the respondent has retained the gravel from which the consideration for the appellants' covenant to mine was to be,
obtained, and is allowed to recover the full. value of the serv~
ices agreed to be rendered.
And the rule of damages applied by a majority of the
court is that upon proof of the breach of the contract, the
mine owner at least established a prima facie case entitling
him to a judgment for the full amount of the royalty. This
is, in effect, saying that if the owner of an automobile agreed
to sell it fora stated amount, upon breach of the contract
by the buyer he may sue for the consideration and in the
absence of any evidence of value by the defendant, be entitled to retain his automobile and have judgment for the
sale price. Such a' doctrine is contrary to the e~ementary
principle that in an action for damages, where the tItle to the
subject matter remains in the vendor, the measure of re~
covery is the difference between the contract price and the
value of what is retained, and it is a part of the plaintiff's
case to establish both factors from which the difference may
be computed. (Boyles v. Kingsbaker Bros. Co., 5 Cal.2d 68
[53 P.2d 141]; Coburn v. California Portland Cement Co.,
144 Cal. 81 [77 P. 771] ; San Francisco Milling Co., Ltd. v.
Frye & Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 563 [38 P.2d 165] ; Bonan :. Pacific Orient Co., 140 Cal.App. 68 [34 P.2d 1064]; ihmo v.
Mitchell, 124 Cal.App. 497 r12 P.2d 101}!)1 : Hougland v. Roth
Blum Packing Co., 99 Cal.App. 631 [279 P. 159]; Nye &
Nissen v. Weed Lumber Co., 92 Cal.App. 598 [268 P. 659] ;
Gopcevic v. California Packing Corp., 64 Cal.App. 132 [220
P. 1078] ; Meyer v. McAllister, 24 Cal.App. 16 [140 P. 42] ;
Cuthill v. Peabody. 19 Cal.App. 304 [125 P. 926]; and see
22 Cal.Jur., p. 1062, sec. 121.)
But even were the rule announced by the majority opinion
correct, its conclusion still may not be justified by the facts
of the case, for the uncontradicted evidence in' the rec~rd
shows that the gravel could be mined at a cost of 30. cents per
cubic yard, thus yielding a profit of 20 cents per cubic yard.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November
4, 1943. Edmonds, .T., voted for a rehearing.

[So F. No. 16763.
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WILLIAM J. CITRON, Responoent, ".J. J. FR,ANKLIN.
Appellant
, r;
[1] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sales-Option-Constmd)
tion.-In a contract granting a purchasing agenta:n })ptio~ to
purchase 25 per cent of the optionor's corporate stock and.,
pI'Oviding that if the optionor sold his stock" to'o.therS prior
to exercise of the option, the optionor would pay the optionee
10 per cent of the amount received on such sale'tlverand
above the amount which the optionor had, pai~ }ntf? the cor~
poration, the parties intended that the optionee' was i iobe .
entitled to the benefit of the 10 per cent provision,immediately:
upon sale to others at any ti~' ~ during the option, and the
optionee was not required, to exercise his option, after the
optionor had sold all of the stock to others;
[2] Evidence--Extrinsic Evidence-Options.-It ,·was 'proper 1;0
sustain objections to questions relating to the optlonee's understanding as to the proportion of the proceeds that he was
entitled to receive from a sale of corporate stock covered by
a written option agreement, where such. questions had no bearing on the issue whether the optionee was required to exercise'
the option, and where they were directed, not to the interpre~
tation that the parties placed on the contract, but simply to
the subjective. understanding of one party.
'

[8] .Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sale~Options-Exten
sion of Time.-Where a contract grantlng a purchasing agent
an option to purchase corporate stock provided that the price
should be computed upon the amount which the optionor ha(l
paid into the corporation, but stittedno method by,.which. the
optionee could determine that amount, the "optio~;!iDipliedly"
required the optionor to furnish the optionee ,with' accurate,
information concerning that amount whehirJerthe. optioti.~~~ .
expressed a desire to exercise' the option;
anY" delay i iii i
furnishing such information would extend theoption"untU:k'
reasonable time after such information had been gi:ven';Ifno
accurate information was ever given, though, ,the," 6ptionec:t.
made timely requests therefor, the option was .'extended,to;
the time of the sale of the stock to third pers0Il:~' r,,:
'

ana •.

McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Corporati6ns, § 3d5~.'1~tEvidende7i .
§ 348.
' . ' ; i i ' ;,;~ "
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"

APPEAL from a judgment of the' Superior Court of the
City and (Jounty of San Francisco. Elmer E. Robinson,
JUdge. Affirmed.
Action to recover upon a contract granting an, option to
purchase a designated percentage of the stock of a corporation. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
B. E. Kragen, George Olshausen, Lionel B. Benas and Keyes
& Erskine for AppeUant.
h
Clarence A. Linn for Respondent.
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THE COURT.-:-A petition for hearing in this case was
granted to the end that, further consideration be given to the
contentions of the appellant. On such consideration we agree
with the disposition of the appeal by the District Court of
Appeal of the First AppeUate District, Division Two, and
adopt as the opirii(ln of this court the opinion of that court
prepared by Justice Spence, with the modifications that here·
inafter appear.
"Plaintiff sought to recover upon It contract. The cause
was tried by the court sitting without a jury and plaintiff
had judgment against defendantJ. J. Franklin in the sum' of
$2646.33." Defendant appeals from the judgment.
"Plaintiff had been engaged for many-years in purchasing
and booking motion pictures for use in the Hawaiian Islands.
Defendant' had been engllged for many years in exhibiting
motion pictures. In 1934, defendant conceived the idea of
organizing a corporation 'in the Hawaiian Islands and of
forming a chain, of motion picture tteatres there together
with a film exchange. In pursuance of this idea, defendant
negotiated with plaintiff and, as a result of the negotiations,
two written contracts were entered into on the same day,
July 20, 1934.
"One of said contracts, attached to the complaint as Exhibit B, purported to be entered into between plaintiff and
the corporation which had not th6n been organized. It was
called a 'Purchasing Agency Agreement' and plaintiff' was
thereby employed by the corporation to actas its purchasing
agent. It further provided that plaintiff should be elected
vice-president of the corporation 'as soon as' same may be
conveniently done.'

"The other of said contracts, attached to the complaint, as
Exhibit A, was entered into by plaintiff and defend~t personally. This is the contract upon which the present'acti?n
was based. It recited that defendant was the owner.'bf 'a1!
the stock of the corporation,' that plaintiff was the purchasing
agent thereof and that defendant desired to grant'plaintiff
the option to purchase 25 per cent of all the stock .own~d ~y
defendant. It was then agreed as follows:
' .,'
" '1. That first party does hereby givean~,'gt;alit'll~~?
second party an option to purchase not' n;tore ,th.an' ~:w~n~?,':~
five per cent (25 %) of all the stock oWl":l:ed: ~ii~.. ~~~H:,bY)}~~~
party in the Franklin Theatres EnterprIses,Ih~~, '8:, cRrpor~•

tIO'~·'2.

\.

. -il:"

.

f;:.

':";,.:ff;'o(t'Unu

it{"·

That the purchase price
ber paidby)r~~cbna.;:~~flY
upon the exercise of the aforesaid'opH~nshal~;:~e"~O#~1:!-r~~
upon the amount of money or other cOllslderatIOnwhlcli,:ftr.,s,-t
party has advanced and paid into thesaidcorpo~a~io~. ~:p~~
the date that the said option shall be' exercised. : ," ' , " ' , :
" '3. It is distinctly understood and'a.greed tliat: th~:afor~:'
said option shall remain in ~orcefor : a', 'pe~iod' 'O'f, :O~~Y~~r:
from the date of the executIOn of th~ 'agreement, It, bem~
understood in this respect, however, thai first pa~ty shaIi);n
no way be precluded from selling or disposing of the said
stock to persons other than second party, provided, howeve,r,
that second party shall share, the proceedS from the sltle 6~
said stock as is provided hereafter.
',' ,
'"
, ,', "
" '4. It is distinctly understood that in the" eVEm~ first
party shall sell his stock in the aforesa~d corporation to ~ny
one other than second party prior to tIle, exercise by secq~~
party of his option, then and in that 'event, ftrs~ pa~y ,agr,e,~~
to pay unto second party ten per cent (10%)' of all, mo~es
and other consideration realized by first partyover and above
the amount of money and other consideration which first
party has paid for the aforesaid stock or has advanced to
'
thc said corporation.'
, 'After entering into these contracts, defendant went to
the islands and acted as the head of the new venture while
plaintiff remained on the mainland and acted as purchasing
agent. The corporation was formed, it prospered and defen·
dant finally sold his stock on May 31, 1937, before plaintifl
had exercised his option to purchase tht: stock but during thE

to'
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ex.tended time for the exercise· of the option as found by the
trIal court.
.
. "There was. but little conflict in thtl evidence. Such con.
flICt as there was .relating to the sale price of the stock and the
amount which defendant had paid into the corporation was
re~olved by the trial court in favor of defendant. The sale
prIce was found to be $30,000 and the amount paid in by
def~n~an~ was found to be $3536.61. The trial court gave
plaIntIff Judgment for 10 per cent of tne difference between
these amounts. On this appeal the findIngs concerning these
amounts are not challenged.
. ~1] "Defendant first contends that the trial court erred
In Imposing any liability upon him as the trial court found
that plaintiff never exercised his option. The trial court
fou:r: d, however, th~t the option had been extended from time
to tIme up to, and Including the time of the sale on May 31
1937.. AssumIng fo~ the moment that this latter finding w~~
sustaIn~d by the ~vIdence, we find no merit' in defendant's
con.tentIOn. The Intent ~nd purpose of the parties appears
entIrely clear and unambIguous from a rea.ding of the option'
a~reement.. Plaintiff desired and the a.greement granted to :.
hIm an optIOn to purchase 25 per cent 0"" all stock owned by
defendant. ~efendant ?~sired to retain and the agreement
reserved to hI~ the prIVIlege of selling all of his stock to
others at any tIme. The agreement then provided that in the
event defendant sold his stock to others 'prior to exercise.
b.y second party of his option,.' defendant would pay to plain.
tiff 10 per cent of the amount received on such sale over and
ab~ve the a.niount which defendant had paid into the corpo.
ratIon .. It IS apparently defendant's :llaIm that plaintiff was
not entIt!ed to the benefit of the last mentioned provision
upon. the sale of t~e stock but only in the event that plaintiff
exerCIsed the optIOn after the sale tad taken place H
s~resses. th,e words .' prior to the exercise by· second pa~ty o~
hIS OptIO~ a:r: d claIms that those words cannot be construed
to mean durIng the life of the option.' In other words de.
fendant urges ~. construction under whichplaintiffw~uld
?ave ?een ~eqUlred togo through the formality of exercis.
Ing hIS optIon to purchase .the stock after defendant had
sold all of his stock to others and at a time when defen.
dant was no lon~er ~n a position to sell any stock to plaintiff.
Such a constructIOn IS wholly unreasonable. '1;'he law does 'not
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require idle acts (Civ. Code, sec. 35?2 )~nd 'the clear 1D:~~~•.
tion of the parties, as evidenced by the termso~t~eagr~~•.
ment, was that plaintiff was to be entit~ed' tothe·benefit.of.
the 10 per cent provision immediately uponthe sale to others
at any time during the life of the option."
..
'. .' .
. [2] Defendant also contends that the co~rt ~ erroneously
sustained objections to questions put to plaIntiff on. cross·
examination, claiming that defendant was thusp!evented.
from proving that plaintiff understood that. h~ ha~ to a.c.
cept his option as a condition precedent to ClaImIng rIghts In
the proceeds from the sale. Objections were sustained to the
first and third of the following questions: "You understand,
Mr. Citron, that you were to receive ten percent. of Mr., Frank.
lin's net profit upon the sale of stock. he held in this co:~
poration Y" "You knew, did you not, that.Mr.Frankl~n
sold 62% per cent of his stock to Mr. Rosen Y" "Whatdid
you 'understand you were to receive fr0n:! the balan.ce of the
37% per cent under your agreement!" These q~estIons .we~e
concerned with the proportion of the' proceeds that plaIntiff
understood he was entitled to recei"Ve under the' contract and
had no . bearing on the' issue whether plaintiff was require~
to exercise the option. In' any event, they were directed,. not
to the interpretation that the parties placed upon the con·
tract, but simply to the subjective understanding of one of
the parties. (Brant v. Oalifornia Daities. Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128,
133 [48 P.2d 13].)
.
[3] .' i Defendant further contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court's finding 'That the term,s
of said agreement, Exhibit A, were. ex~ended from tim~ ,to
time and up to and including thedatt: of which defendant,
J. J. Franklin, sold all of his capital I:!tock in the Franklin
Theatrical Enterprises, Ltd., to Adolph Ramish, to wit:. May
311937.' The evidence on this issue is quite voluminousan4
inciludes both letters and conversations.. Neither the Writin~
of the letters nor the making of the (.Ira: statements was de'..
nied by defendant. We need refer only to someportion,s
of these letters' and statements.
"The written agreement was made c.c July 20, 1934, arid,
by its terms, the option was to remain h...force foro~e year.
After executing the agreement, defendant· spent mostof'his
time in the islands while. plaintiff spent most of his timeo:b.
the mainland. At an early date, two men, Ramish· and RoS~,

; t
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had also become financially interested In the venture, Mr.
Ramish being made president and Mr. Rosen a vice-president
of the corporation. On May 23, 1935, and before the expiration of the one year, plaintiff wrote to defendant, 'I informed him (Rosen) I was ready tc put rrp my end of it and
I presume either you or he will call Jlj me shortly to cover
my 25% interest. Am glad everythiug is going along fine.
Feel confident the four of us will be on the easy side of the
street. ' On May 31, 1935, defendant replied: 'Regarding
your interest you need not worry about that in the ieast.
Whenever you are ready, you will make the deal with me
as I suppose you know that my word IS as good as a bond
even if you didn't have a contract. . .. We all of course,
are directors. I am glad that you realize that we are on the
way and that we are almost reaching chI:' goal we set out to
reach. I am not forgetting for one moment, regardless of
what you say I accomplished, the fine work that you did and
without which I could not have accomplished what we did so
far. A company with four men with experience that we have
had must go places. We have everythmg in our favor.'
"On June 6, 1935, plaintiff I!.gainwrote defendant: 'You
may be assured that I have the _tmost confidence in what
you say and when you come to the mainland we can arrange
t.tll matters pertaining to my interest witt the company.' On
July 5, 1935, defendant wrote plaintiff, '1 have been held up
here because of the many changes that we have had to make
in the plans of the King .Theatre but hope to get away very
shortly and then we will be able to get together with you
on your contract. . .. I cannot forget your loyalty throughout the storm, and I want to say to you that I am happy
to have you as one of my partners.'
"Defendant did not come to the mainland as soon as expected and on September 25, 1935, he wrote plaintiff: 'As I
told youin previous correspondence that my word is as good
as any bond and that I would live up to my agreement with
you... .' On November 7, 1935, plaintiff wrote defendant:
'I would like to know what amount of ;rour stock and interest
you would want me to take and just what it would cost me
in round numbers 1 Of course, you know that I am nota
man of means and have very little casn that I can place my
fingers on.' On November 14, 1935, defendant wrote plaintiff: 'Regarding the stock, whcn you are out here (Honolulu)
we will discuss that matter further. We had an understand-
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ing and when you come here we will discuss it further. When
you see what we have here you will realize the op~ort~i.ty.'
"In December 1935, plaintiff, R.osen and RamlSh vlSlted,
Honolulu and conferred with defendant. Plaintiff's testimony of the conversations then held cmd subsequently held
concerning the option was corrobora.ted by Rosen and was
not denied by defendant. Plaintiff said, 'How about my end
of it 1 I want to take up my option.' Defendant said, 'We
are too busy. I can't talk now. You don"t have to worry~:
My word is my bond. You can come in any time you wanq,
When plaintiff asked for the information concerning the.
amount defendant had invested, defendant told him that. h~.
was 'very; very busy,' that it was the 'wrong/time,' to talk;
about it but that he would give him the information in the.
'very near future.'
; , : ' . ' ",'ii,
"In 1936, defendant came to the. mainland and conferr~d';
with plaintiff, Rosen and Ramish. The subject of the option-:
was again discusse.d .. It will be. remembered that the _Un~ij
challenged finding of the trial court .shows .that defendant (
had paid into the corporation only $3536;61: In their .convel'~<
sations, plaintiff said: 'Jack,. now that you are here from
Honolulu I want to know definitely how much I.am to put.,
,
.
h .. t
up for my option of twenty-five per cent. Tell mew at 1t·lS.,;:
Defendant said 'Listen, I put up $42,000 of my own money. ~,
Both plaintiff and Rosen took exception to this figure, plaintiff saying it was 'ridiculous' and Rosen saying 'You haven't.:
got that kind of money.' Plaintiff asked defendantfol',a;
statement of the amounts advanced butdejendant.'put it off'·
saying, 'I am too busy. I have to goqack to,.theislands.' ".:
"The correspondence continued aftel"; d~f~ndant's !return)
to the islands but the tone of the letters; graduallybecame.i
less cordial. On October 16, 1936, defendant ,:wrote to Jllain;1~
tiff 'Consolidated are now very anxious to make: a deal :a16ng~:
the' lines we discussed' and if our partners. will not be think:if
ing. only of themselves we will come out with flying colors.:;
Everything points to succe~.' On the same day, plaintiff,
wrote to defendant: 'As you must know, ,had you given me,
the exact amount you put into the theatre project, as now'
appears on the books of the company, I certainly would have,
handed you my check and I feel eonfident I could have put
over a deal you now have in mind, ,You have alwaysinformed:
me that you had invested. At one time yoe told me $32,000,
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at another tim.e $40,OOO~,Both Mr~ R~niish and Mr. Rosen
on: several occa,sions; informed me that vou had been credited,
with $15,000 o~ t~e company's books. •So you see, Jack; my
reason for hesItatm~. You assured me many times that I
could come in any time I desired. Tb.at your word with me
was always, good and that whenever I was ready I could
come in., I have' always been ready bu" the above held me
back.'
"Defendant replied on November 11. 1936: '.As to what
Ramish says J' have invested, he can say what he likes the
books will show I invested over $41,000.00 and not $15,000.00
as he, says~ The ~tatement I gave you some time ago was
made out by Mr. Turner, in that one it was $32,000.00, but
I have since shown that it is $41,000.00,' On December 14
1936, defendant again wrote: "Regardinr Mr. Ramish's state:,
ment of what I iiivested, it does not interest me in the least
for it is contemptible falsehood. I showed you my investment, made up by Mr. Turner, from my invoices. Since thEm
other invoices were given to Mr. Turner which made it $42 000 .
but that is neith?rhere nor there. Our deal was not p~edi:
cated ~n what I mv:ested. You have certainly had every oppor~umty to come. m .b~t' so far you never took advantage
of It. It would be rIdIculous to base the business on the
amount of money Mr. Ramish suggests My books speak for
themselves. '
"On January 5, 1937, defendant wrote: 'I always told
you I would take care of you, meaning that you would not
have to take up your stock according, to the time limit in
your contract, but if we, should sell the business and you
have not taken up your stock by that time you certainly
couldn't expect me to close with you at such time ... ' you
~ave the same opportunitytodsy that you had when we
sIgned ~he co~tract, but it must be exercised before a sale of
the busmess IS made, otherwise same will not be recognized
b'y me.' Plaintiff replied on January 25, 1937: 'For a long
tIme past, Jack, r have been willing and anxious to take up
the option according to our agreement. I asked you for a
statement of the amount invested by you so that I would know
the ~mount of my prorata, but was unable to get a clear
defimte statement. If you will give mEl an exact statement
of the am~unt invested in the company by you, I will act
on the optIon as SOon as I can verify your statement. As
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you know, I ,have not access to the bockS andrttti.\iSt:tiep~~
on the officers of the company to furnj'3hme'the.figures~'
Defendant replied to this letter on February ,3:1937:
garding the stock again I don't know how' I could ,make my.:
self clearer than I have in my last letter;'no one iri the wOrld
could ever accuse me of ever taking advantage of anyone'6r
ever breaking my word. Ramishand Rosen 'ha:venothing
whatsoever to do with our transaction andaga.i:rl:let me' lid~
vise you that I do not care what either of them s,ay 1 ihv~ed;
because whatever they say in this respect is "not \'the' facts:
However, what I invested in the business has'nothing what-'
ever to do with our contract, but let me again remind you:
that I handed you a statement madeoutby"Mr, Turner while
he was inL. A. of all expenditures I had made and that
amounted to $38,000.00. I again explained to "you that!
gave them additional $8000.00 worth of bills when Turner
came to Honolulu, but in a thousand years, you, nor anyone
else, will be able to make out his books the way he has the~
setup now... , How then, can you ever expect to get any
proper figures even if you should want them from him. As
- per the contract which I made with you, which stated that
you could come in on twenty-five per cent of-my holdings,
none can say that you have offered to take up your option and
that I refused it, but circumstances occur where options
cannot last forever, because of certain conditions." Therefore;
I again say that although your option ran out, you can take
advantage of the opportunity providing-you take-ft immedi.
ately,otherwise you cannot expect me to feel any further
obligation in the matter as I have been more than' :fair 'in
this entire transaction. You realize that a sale of the business
may be made any day or a deal :may be made that requires
quick action and unless you have made your investment
before that time, you can't expect me to hold up deals as that
is asking too much.' On February 18, 1937, plaintiff replied:
'Note what you say regarding the -Option. Just as soon as)
can get the necessary data beassl1red Jack I want to
advantage of the option you have extended me.'
"Defendant apparently concedes, at ieast for the purpose
of argument, .that the time for the' exercise of the option- wlis
extended but claims that the evidence was insufficient to
support the finding' that, the time was extended to arid Ui.
cluding the time of the sale on May 31, 1937. It is argued

'm:
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that the extension was for an unspecified time, that it therefore covered only a reasonable time and that a reasonable
time expired prior to May 31, 1937. Defendant further argues under a separate heading that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the extension was based
upon a good and sufficient consideration. Plaintiff argues
that the time provision for the exercise of the option was
waived by both written and oral agreements for extensions
based upon good and sufficient consideration and that defendant, by his fraudulent conduct, prevented the exercise
of the option and was estopped. In the reply brief, defendant
argues that as neither prevention of performance nor estoppel was pleaded, plaintiff may not rely thereon.
"As we view the situation, many of these contentions need
not be considered here for the reasons tereinafter stated. The
action was one upon an option agreement which was ~dmit
tedly made upon a good and sufficient consideration. It was
executed contemporaneously with an d.greement for the employment of plaintiff by the corporatIon as its purchasing
agent. Plaintiff served in that capacit~, with the corporation
until the time of the sale and continued to serve. thereafter.
The option agreement provided that the option price should
be computed upon the amount which defendant had paid into
the corporation. No method was provided by the express
terms of the agreement to enable plaintiff to. determine the
amount which defendant had so paid. We therefore believe
it necessary, in order to make the agreement reaso~able, to
read into the agreement the implied terms that defendant
would furnish plaintiff with. accurate bformation concerning
that amount at any time that plaintiff expressed his desirc
to exercise said option during the life thereof and that any
delay on the part of the defendant in furnishing such information would extend the life of the vption until a reasonable time after such information had been furnished by defendant. (Civ. Code, sec. 1655.) If these terms were not
implied terms of the agreement, then plaintiff would have
had no way of determining (1) whether it was desirable to
exercise the option or (2) the amount to be tendered to defenda,nt ~n the exercise thereof.
"Under the express' terms of the option agreement the
life of the option was from July 20,.1934, to JUly 20, 1935.
The evidence shows that :plaintiff expressed his desire to exer-
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cise the option as early as May 23, 1935, in a letter written
to defendant on that date. Thereafter plaintiff reaffirmed
his desire to exercise the option on numerous occasions and
made repeated requests to defendant to furnish him with the
necessary information. No accurate information was furnished to plaintiff by defendant at any time. For some period of time after May 23, 1935, and despite repeated requests
by plaintiff, defendant gave no information whatever concerning the amount but gave plaintiff the broadest assurances
that his option could be exercised at any time. Thereafter
defendant grossly misrepresented the amount which he had
paid into the corporation, insisting that he had paid into
the corporation approximately ten times the amount which
he had actually so paid. Plaintiff took exception to these
misrepresentations and reaffirmed his desire to exercise his
option upon the basis specified in the option agreement. In
his letters of December 14, 1936, and February 3, 1937, defendant denied that the amount that he had actually invested
in the corporation had anything to d:, with the exercise of
the option thereby repudiating the terms of the option agreement. In the first of said letters he stated 'My books speak
for themselves' indicating that he considered the parties
bound by the figures shown by the books. tn the second of
said letters, he repudiated the figures shown by said books.
The only conclusion that can be' drawn . from the admitted
facts is that defendant, through fraudulent representati9llS,
endeavored to gain an unconscionable advlintageover plaintiff either by persuading plaintiff to refrain from exercising
a valuable option or by obtaining fromplaintlff thousanqs
of dollars to which defendant was not entitled' in the event
that plaintiff did exercise said option.'. In any event, the1lncontradicted evidence shows that defendant wholly ,failed· to .
furnish plaintiff with accurate informaticnat any time,ruid .
under our view of the implied terms of the option agreement;'
the life of the option was thereby extended at least'to/{nd
including the time of the sale as found by the trial court. ";('·'1
The judgment is affirmed.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November
4, 1943.

